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Abstract— Adversarial examples of deep neural networks are
receiving ever increasing attention because they help in under-
standing and reducing the sensitivity to their input. This is
natural given the increasing applications of deep neural networks
in our everyday lives. When white-box attacks are almost always
successful, it is typically only the distortion of the perturbations
that matters in their evaluation. In this work, we argue that
speed is important as well, especially when considering that fast
attacks are required by adversarial training. Given more time,
iterative methods can always find better solutions. We investigate
this speed-distortion trade-off in some depth and introduce a
new attack called boundary projection (BP) that improves upon
existing methods by a large margin. Our key idea is that
the classification boundary is a manifold in the image space:
we therefore quickly reach the boundary and then optimize
distortion on this manifold.
Index Terms— Adversarial attack, deep learning.
I. INTRODUCTION
ADVERSARIAL examples [37] are small, usually imper-ceptible perturbations of images or other data [9] that
can arbitrarily modify a classifier’s prediction. They have
been extended to other tasks like object detection or semantic
segmentation [45], and image retrieval [25], [39]. They are 
typically generated in a white-box setting, where the attacker
has full access to the classifier model and uses gradient signals
through the model to optimize for the perturbation. They 
are becoming increasingly important because they reveal the
sensitivity of neural networks to their input [2], [15], [35] 
including trivial cases [3], [14] and they easily transfer
between different models [28], [41].
Adversarial examples are typically evaluated by probability 
of success and distortion. In many cases, white-box attacks
have probability of success near one, then only distortion
matters, as a (weak) measure of imperceptibility and also of 
the difficulty with which adversarial samples can be detected.
The speed of an attack is less frequently discussed. The 
fast single-step FGSM attack [17] produces high-distortion
examples where adversarial patterns can easily be recognized.
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At the other extreme, the Carlini & Wagner (C&W) attack [8],
considered state of the art, is notoriously expensive. Decou-
pling direction and norm (DDN) [32] has recently shown
impressive progress in distortion and mostly in speed.
Speed becomes more important when considering adver-
sarial training [17]. This defense, where adversarial examples
are used for training, was in fact introduced in the same work
as FGSM. This attack remains the most common choice for
generating those examples because of its speed. However,
adversarial training is easily broken [40] unless a more pow-
erful attack like PGD is used [27].
In this work, we investigate in more depth the speed-
distortion trade-off in the regime of probability of success
near one. We observe that iterative attacks often oscillate
across the classification boundary, taking long time to stabi-
lize. We introduce a new attack that rather walks along the
boundary, as discussed in Sect. I-B. As a result, we improve
the state of the art in distortion while keeping the number of
iterations at a minimum. Our key idea is that, once we reach
the adversarial region near the boundary, the problem becomes
optimization on a manifold [1], in particular, minimization of
the 2 distortion on a level set of the classification loss. When
in the adversarial region, we project the distortion gradient
on the tangent space of this manifold. We do this simply by
targeting a particular reduction of the distortion while moving
orthogonally to the gradient of the classification loss.
Quantization is another major issue in this literature. Most
papers implicitly assume that the output of a white-box attack
is a matrix where pixel values are real numbers in [0, 1].
Paper [32] is one of the rare works where the output is
quantized. We agree with this definition of the problem.
Indeed, an adversarial image is above all an image. The goal
of an attacker is to publish images deluding the classifier (for
instance on the web), and publishing implies compliance with
pixels encoded in bytes.
Although adversarial training is not the focus of this work,
we do experiment with it to validate that i) our attack is fast
enough for this task, and ii) the network gains a better defense
when being prepared for a worse attack. Recent improve-
ments in adversarial training [42] are orthogonal to our work,
by replacing the common choice of PGD with our attack.
A. Contributions
To our knowledge, we are the first to
• Study optimization on the manifold of the classification
boundary for an adversarial attack, providing an analysis
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Fig. 1. Adversarial attacks on a binary classifier in two dimensions. The two class regions are shown in red and blue. Contours indicate class probabilities.
The objective is to find a point in the red (adversarial) region that is at the minimal distance to input x. Gray (black) paths correspond to low (high) distortion
budget  for PGD2 [22] (a, in green) or parameter λ for C&W [8] (b). The simulation is only meant to illustrate basic properties of the methods. In particular,
it does not include Adam optimizer [20] for C&W.
under the constraints of staying on the tangent space of
the manifold and of reaching a distortion budget.
• Investigate theoretically and experimentally the quantiza-
tion impact on the perturbation.
• Achieve at the same speed as I-FGSM [22] (20 iterations)
and under the constraint of a quantization, less distortion
than state-of-the-art attacks including DDN, which needs
100 iterations on ImageNet.
• Propose a benchmark fairly comparing distortion con-
strained and success constrained attacks (see defini-
tions (3) and (2)).
B. Graphical Abstract Illustrating the Attacks
To better understand how our attack works, Figure 1 illus-
trates qualitatively a number of existing attacks technically
described in Sect. II-B. On this toy 2d classification problem,
the class boundary and the path followed by the optimizer
starting at input x can be easily visualized.
PGD2, an 2 version of I-FGSM [22], a.k.a. PGD [27],
is controlled by a distortion budget  and eventually follows
a path on a ball of radius  centered at x (cf . Fig. 1(a)).
Section IV shows that testing different  values is an expensive
strategy for finding the optimal distortion budget per image.
C&W [8] depends on a parameter λ that controls the
balance between distortion and classification loss. A low value
leads to failure. A higher value indeed reaches the optimal
perturbation, but with oscillations across the class boundary
(Fig. 1(b)). Therefore, an expensive line search over λ is
performed internally.
DDN [32] increases or decreases distortion on the fly
depending on success and while pointing towards the gradient
direction (Fig. 1(c)). It arrives quickly near the optimal pertur-
bation but still suffers from oscillations across the boundary.
On the contrary, boundary projection (BP), introduced in
this work (cf . Fig. 1(d)), cares more about quickly reaching the
boundary, not necessarily near the optimal solution, and then
walks along the boundary, staying mostly in the adversarial
(red) region. It therefore makes steady progress towards the
solution rather than going back and forth.
C. Related Works
Before developing the state-of-the-art of white-box attacks
in Sect. II-B, we point out other related works.
1) Optimization on Manifolds: In the context of deep learn-
ing, stochastic gradient descent on Riemanian manifolds has
been studied, e.g. RSGD [5] and RSVRG [46]. It is usually
applied to manifolds whose geometry is known in analytic
form, for instance Grassmann [5] or Stiefel manifolds [18].
In most cases, the motivation is to optimize a very complex
function like a classification loss on a well-studied manifold,
e.g. matrix manifold [1]. On the contrary, we optimize a simple
quadratic function (the distortion) on a complex manifold not
known in analytic form, i.e. a level set of the classification
loss.
2) Information Forensics and Security (IFS): The con-
nection between adversarial examples and the field of IFS
has been made recently. Paper [31] provides a conceptual
link between machine learning and watermarking allowing to
transfer attacks and defenses known in one field to another.
Paper [33] adapts a steganalyzer to detect adversarial images.
Nearest Neighbours Search (NNS) is another classical tool
in IFS. Looking at adversarial examples through the lens of
NNS provides a theoretical explanation of the vulnerability of
networks producing high intrinsic dimensionality features [2].
The study of their neighborhood has been exploited to design
adversarial image detectors [7], [10]. The authors of [13]
look at this problem under the framework of game theory.
The authors of [38] introduce a secret key into the classifier
to prevent white-box attacks. This gives an advantage to the
defender following the Kerckhoffs principle. Security threats
also hold at training time by poisoning the data to conceal
backdoors [4].
Our work focuses on forging adversarial examples. Our
intention is to fairly assess their power with or without
defenses. Inspired by the methodology for assessing water-
marking robustness [16], our protocol introduces in Sect. IV-B
the operating characteristic of an attack. It reveals the trade-
off between distortion and probability of success. We also
pay attention to real life conditions obvious in watermarking
and steganography but overlooked in adversarial literature:
adversarial images are quantized.
II. PROBLEM, BACKGROUND AND STATE OF THE ART
A. Problem Formulation
1) Preliminaries: Let X := {0,, . . . , 1 − , 1}n with
 := 1/(L − 1) denote the set of grayscale images of n
pixels quantized to L levels, and let X̂ := [0, 1]n denote
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the corresponding real-valued images. An image of more than
one color channels is treated independently per channel; in
this case n stands for the product of pixels and channels.
A classifier f : X̂ → Rk maps an image x to a vector f (x) ∈
R
c+ representing probabilities per class over c given classes.
The parameters of the classifier are not shown here because
they remain fixed in this work. The classifier prediction π :
X̂ → [c] := {1, . . . , c} maps x to the class label having the
maximum probability:
π(x) := arg max
k∈[c] f (x)k . (1)
The prediction is correct if π(x) = t , the true label.
2) Problem: Let x ∈ X be a given image with known true
label t . An adversarial example y ∈ X is an image such that
the distortion x − y is small and the probability f (y)t is




f (y)t subject to x − y ≤ , (2)
where  is a given distortion budget. The performance
is then measured by the probability of success Psuc :=




x − y subject to π(y) = t . (3)
The performance is then measured by the expected
distortion D := (x − y).
This work focuses on the second form, but we present
example attacks of both forms in section II-B.
3) Untargeted Attack: The constraint π(y) = t in (3) is
referred to as an untargeted attack, meaning that y is misclas-
sified regardless of the actual prediction. As an alternative,
a targeted attack requires that the prediction π(y) = t  is a
target label t  = t . We focus on the former.
4) Loss Function: We focus on a white-box attack in this
work. Such an attack is specific to f , which is public.
In this setting, attacks typically rely on exploiting the gradient
of some loss function, using variants of gradient descent.
A classification loss is defined on the probability vector p =
f (y) with respect to the true label t . For an untargeted attack,
this is typically the negative of cross-entropy (p, t) := log pt .
We should warn that, while the cross-entropy is appropriate for
bringing examples into the region of class t during classifier
training, its negative is in general not appropriate for pulling
them out during an attack. This is because this function is
mostly flat in the class region. A common solution is to
normalize the gradient of  [17], [32], assuming it is nonzero.
We consider more options in this work. A targeted attack on
the other hand may use − log pt  , which works fine because
it brings examples into class t  region.
5) Distortion: This work focuses on the 2-norm · as a
measure of distortion. Alternatives like 1-norm and ∞-norm
are also common [8], [17]. It is known that none is
appropriate for measuring the imperceptibility of adversarial
attacks, while more sophisticated measures like structural
similarity (SSIM) [43] are limited too [34]. Measuring imper-
ceptibility is arguably as difficult as classification itself.
6) Integral Constraint: The constraint y ∈ X in (2) and (3)
is typically relaxed to y ∈ X̂ during optimization. Some
works conclude the attack by loosely quantizing the optimal
solution onto X , typically by truncation towards zero. To our
knowledge, DDN [32] is the only work to do rounding instead,
and at the end of each iteration. Quantization is becoming an
important issue in adversarial examples because the distor-
tions achieved in recent papers are so small that quantization
impacts a lot the perturbations. Appendix A provides a more
in-depth study of the impact of the quantization.
B. State-of-the-art Attacks
1) Distortion Constrained Attacks: Given a distortion bud-
get , the fast gradient sign method (FGSM) [17] performs a
single step in the opposite direction of the (element-wise) sign
of the loss gradient with ∞-norm ,
y := x −  sign∇x( f (x), t). (4)
This is the fastest method for problem (2). In the same
work adversarial training was introduced, this method quickly
generates adversarial examples for training. However, the per-
turbations are usually high-distortion and visible. The itera-
tive-FGSM (I-FGSM) [22] initializes y0 := x and then iterates
yi+1 := projB∞[x;](yi − α sign∇x( f (yi ), t)), (5)
where projection1 is element-wise to the closed ∞-norm ball
B∞[x; ] of radius  and center x, and also to X̂ (element-
wise clipping to interval [0, 1]). This method is also known as
basic iterative method (BIM) [30] and as projected gradient
descent (PGD) [27]. We refer to as PGD2 a 2-norm version
replacing (5) with
yi+1 := projB2[x;](yi − αη(∇x( f (yi ), t))), (6)
where η(x) := x/ x denotes 2-normalization, and projection
is to the closed 2-norm ball B2[x; ] of radius  and center x,
followed again by element-wise clipping to [0, 1]. Although
this method is part of Cleverhans library [30], it is not
published according to our knowledge.
2) Success Constrained Attacks: This family of attacks is
typically more expensive. DeepFool [29] is a popular attack
which, at each iteration, estimates the distortion needed to
go to any class region k = t in order to infer which one is
the closest.. Paper [37] propose a Lagrangian formulation of
problem (3), minimizing the cost function
J (y, λ) := x − y2 + λ( f (y), t), (7)
where variable λ is a Lagrange multiplier. They carry out this
optimization by box-constrained L-BFGS.
The attack of [8], denoted by C&W in the sequel, pertains
to this approach. A change of variable eliminates the box
constraint, replacing y ∈ X by σ(w), where w ∈ Rn and σ
is the element-wise sigmoid function. The classification loss
encourages the logit log pt to be less than any other log pk for
k = t by at least margin m ≥ 0,
m(p, t) := [log pt −max
k =t log pk + m]+, (8)
1We define projA(u) := arg minv∈A u − v.
3
where [·]+ denotes the positive part. This function is similar
to the multi-class SVM loss by Crammer and Singer [11],
where m = 1, and, apart from the margin, it is a hard version
of negative cross-entropy  where softmax is producing the
classifier probabilities. It does not have the problem of being
flat in the region of class t . The C&W attack uses the Adam
optimizer [20] to minimize the cost function
J (w, λ) := σ(w)− x2 + λm( f (σ (w)), t). (9)
for w ∈ Rn . When the margin is reached, loss m vanishes
and the distortion term pulls σ(w) back towards x, causing
oscillations around the margin. This is repeated for different
λ2 by line search, which is expensive.
Decoupling direction and norm (DDN) [32] is iterating
similarly to PGD2 (6),
yi+1 := projS[x;ρi](yi − αη(∇x( f (yi ), t))), (10)
but projection is to the sphere S[x; ρi ] of radius ρi and center
x, and the radius is adapted to the current distortion: It is set to
ρi = (1−γ )yi−x if yi is adversarial and to (1+γ )yi−x
otherwise, where parameter γ ∈ (0, 1). Another difference is
that each iteration is concluded by a projection onto X (rather
than X̂ ) by element-wise clipping to [0, 1] and rounding.
3) Discussion: Optimizing around the class boundary is
not a new idea. All of the above attacks do so in order
to minimize distortion; implicitly, even distortion constrained
attacks like PGD2 do so, if the minimum parameter  is sought
(cf . Figure 1(a) and Section IV-B). Even black-box attacks do
so [6], without having access to the gradient function. The
difference of our attack is that our updates are along the class
boundary, i.e., in a direction normal to the gradient.
4) Other Attacks: Generative models like AdvGAN [44] can
not be classified as success or distortion constrained attacks.
This approach is a tour de force generating adversarial image
impressively fast at testing. Yet, the runtime for training is not
mentioned and this is an issue because each target class needs
a dedicated generative network. The distortion is integrated in
the loss at training, but it is not optimized sample by sample
since there is no way to control it during testing. Indeed,
the perturbation is highly visible in [44, Fig. 3] and has larger
distortion than C&W (see their Table 8).
III. METHOD
Our attack is an iterative process with a fixed number K of
iterations. Stage 1 aims at quickly producing an adversarial
image, whereas Stage 2 is a refinement phase decreasing
distortion. The key property of our method is that while in the
adversarial region during refinement, it tries to walk along the
classification boundary by projecting the distortion gradient
onto the tangent hyperplane of the boundary. Hence we call it
boundary projection (BP).
A. Stage 1
This stage begins at y0 = x and iteratively updates in the
direction of the gradient of the loss function as summarized
2Referred to as c in [8].
Algorithm 1 Stage 1
Input: x: original image to be attacked
Input: t: true label (untargeted)
Output: y with π(y) = t or failure, iteration i
1: Initialize y0 ← x, i ← 0
2: while (π(yi) = t) ∧ (i < K ) do
3: ĝ← η(∇x( f (yi ), t))  η: 2-normalization
4: yi+1 ← clip[0,1](yi − αγi ĝ)
5: i ← i + 1
6: end while
Fig. 2. Refinement stage of BP. Case OUT when |V | > 1 (a); case IN (b).
in Algorithm 1. The gradient is 2-normalized (line 3) and then
scaled by two parameters (line 4): a fixed parameter α > 0
and a parameter γi that is increasing linearly with iteration
i ≤ K as follows
γi := γmin + i
K + 1 (1− γmin) < 1, (11)
where γmin ∈ (0, γmax). This makes the updates slow at the
beginning to keep distortion low, then faster until the attack
succeeds. Parameter α is set empirically to a value large
enough so that Stage 1 returns an adversarial image in less
than K iterations with high probability. This schedule of γi is
meant to adjust the level of distortion to each original image,
since a single value would be hard to fit all cases. After the
update, Clipping is element-wise (line 4).
B. Stage 2
Once Stage 1 has succeeded, Stage 2 continues by iteratively
considering two cases: if yi is adversarial, case OUT aims at
minimizing distortion while staying in the adversarial region.
Otherwise, case IN aims at decreasing the loss while control-
ling the distortion. Both work with a first order approximation
of the loss around yi :
( f (yi + u), t) ≈ ( f (yi ), t)+ ug, (12)
where g = ∇x( f (yi ), t). The perturbation at iteration i is
δi := yi−x. Stage 2 is summarized in Algorithm 2. Cases OUT
and IN illustrated in Fig. 2 are explained below.
1) Case OUT: takes as input yi outside class t region, i.e.
π(yi) = t (line 5). It outputs yi+1 which is a quantized
version of vector z (line 9). The construction of z stems from
two constraints. First, we control the distortion of the next
perturbation imposing the constraint z− x = , so that z
will lie on the hypersphere S[x; ]. This radius uses again the
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Algorithm 2 Stage 2
Input: t: true label (untargeted), i current iteration number
Input: yi : current adversarial image, : distortion budget
Output: yK
1: while i < K do
2: δi ← yi − x  perturbation
3: ĝ← η(∇x( f (yi ), t))  direction
4: r ← 〈δi , ĝ〉
5: if π(yi) = t then  OUT
6:  ← γi δi  distortion control
7: v← x + r ĝ
8: z← v + η(yi − v)
√[2 − r2]+
9: yi+1 ← QOUT(z, yi )  quantization (17)
10: else  IN
11:  ← δi /γi  distortion control




2 − δi2 + r2
)
ĝ
13: yi+1 ← Q IN(z, yi )  quantization (20)
14: end if
15: i ← i + 1
16: end while
scheduling (11),  = γi δi < δi, such that updates decel-
erate to convergence once the attack has already succeeded.
We also impose that z lies on
P := {v ∈ Rn : 〈v − yi , ĝ〉 = 0}, (13)
the tangent hyperplane of the level set of the loss at yi , normal
to ĝ. This second constraint aims at maintaining the value of
the loss, up to the first order.
Consider the projection v := x + r ĝ of x onto hyperplane
P , where r := 〈δi , ĝ〉. If r < , the hypersphere intersects
the hyperplane as shown in Fig. 2(a), and both constraints are
met. From the infinity of points in this intersection, we pick
the one closest to yi :
z = v + η(yi − v)
√
2 − r2. (14)
If r ≥ , then S[x; ]∩P = ∅. We prefer to relax the constraint
on the distortion, and choose z = v, which is by definition
the closest point of P to x. Note that v = yi if δi , ĝ are
collinear.
This is formally summarized as follows:
z := arg min
v∈V v − yi (15)
V := arg min
v∈P |v − x − | . (16)
Here, V is the set of points on P having distortion close to .
If r < , V = S[x; ] ∩ P = ∅ as illustrated in Fig. 2(a),
otherwise V = {v}. The solution z has a unique closed form,
implemented in line 8.
Directly quantizing vector z onto X by Q(·),
the component-wise rounding, modifies its norm (see App. A).
This pulls down our effort to control the distortion. Instead,
the process QOUT(z, yi ) in line 9 looks for the scale βOUT of the
perturbation to be applied such that Q(yi+β(z−yi)) = z.
This is done with a simple line search over β. Then,
QOUT(z, yi ) := Q(yi + βOUT(z− yi )). (17)
2) Case IN: takes as input yi inside class t region, i.e.
π(yi) = t (line 10). We control distortion  = δi /γi >
δi (11) such that updates decelerate as in Case OUT. We then
solve the problem:






i.e., find the point z at the intersection of sphere S[x; ] and
the ray through yi in the direction opposite of g as shown
in Fig. 2(b). The solution is simple:




2 − δi2 + r2
)
ĝ, (19)
Vector z moves away from yi along direction −ĝ by a step
size so to reach S[x, ]. Case IN is not guaranteed to succeed,
but invoking it means that Stage 1 has succeeded.
Again a direct rounding jeopardizes the norm of the update
z−yi . Especially, quantization likely results in Q(z) = Q(yi )
if z−yi < βmin = 0.1 (see App. A). Instead of a line search
as in method OUT, line 13 just makes sure that this event will
not happen:
Q IN(z, yi ) = Q(yi + βIN(z− yi )), (20)
with βIN = max(1, βmin/z − yi).
C. Discussion
The heuristic scheduling (11) builds on a simpler idea of
DDN [32], where parameter γ is constant across iterations.
This scheduling controls the distortion: In stage 1, updates are
small at the beginning to keep distortion low, then larger until
the attack succeeds. In stage 2, updates are decreasing as γi
tends to 1. It increases the distortion when the current image
is correctly classified (IN) and decreases the distortion when
the current image is adversarial (OUT).
The fact that (γi )i is strictly increasing shows that,
in Stage 2, an IN iteration (distortion grows by 1/γi ) followed
by an OUT iteration (distortion decays by γi+1 < 1) is indeed
equivalent to a milder IN in the sense that the distortion grows
γi+1/γi > 1 smaller than 1/γi . Similarly, OUT followed by IN
is equivalent to a mild OUT in the sense that distortion decays
by γi/γi+1 < 1. Both cases lead towards the class boundary
by a factor that tends to 1. If the algorithm keeps alternating
between OUT and IN and we only look at the OUT iterates
(remember, all attacks output the successful iterate of least
distortion), this is equivalent to strictly decreasing distortion.
This behavior is more stable than having a constant parameter
as in DDN.
From all the possible increasing sequences that go to 1 as
i goes to the maximum number of iterations, we pick the
simplest one: a linear sequence. All this behaviour is controlled
by a single parameter, which simplifies the algorithm. That is
the only heuristic.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
In this section we compare our method boundary projection
(BP) to the attacks presented in Sect. II, namely: FGSM [17],
I-FGSM [22], PGD2 (6), C&W [8], and DDN [32]. This
benchmark is carried out on three well-known datasets, with
a different neural network for each.
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A. Parameters of the Attacks
Below we specify the attacks parameters for each dataset.
Appendix C details the networks and training parameters.
For the distortion constrained attacks i.e. FGSM, I-FGSM
and PGD2, we test a set of  and calculate Psuc and D
according to our evaluation protocol (cf . section IV-B). For
C&W, we test several parameter settings and pick up the
optimum setting as specified below. For DDN, the parameter
settings are the default [32], i.e. 0 = 1.0 and γ = 0.05.
MNIST [24]: App. C details the network with accuracy 0.99.
Parameters. α = 0.08 for I-FGSM, α = /2 for PGD2. For
C&W: for 5× 20 iterations,3 learning rate η = 0.5 and initial
constant λ = 1.0; for 1×100 iterations, η = 0.1 and λ = 10.0.
CIFAR10 [21]: App. C details the network with accuracy
0.93. Parameters. α = 0.08 for I-FGSM, α = /2 for PGD2.
For C&W: for 5 × 20 iterations, learning rate η = 0.1 and
initial constant λ = 0.1; for 1× 100 iterations, η = 0.01, and
λ = 1.0.
ImageNet [23]: comprises 1,000 images from Ima-
geNet [12]. We use InceptionV3 pre-trained [36] whose accu-
racy is 0.96. Parameters. α = 0.08 for I-FGSM, α = 3 for
PGD2. For C&W: for 5×20 iterations, learning rate η = 0.01
and initial constant λ = 20; for 1× 100 iterations, η = 0.01
and λ = 1.0.
B. Evaluation Protocol
We evaluate an attack by its runtime, two global statis-
tics Psuc and D, and by an operating characteristic curve
D → P(D) measuring distortion vs. probability of success
as described below.
Since we focus on the speed-distortion trade-off, we mea-
sure the required time for all attacks. For the iterative attacks,
the complexity of one iteration is largely dominated by the
computation of the gradient, which requires one forward and
one backward pass through the network. It is thus fair to
gauge their complexity by this number, referred to as itera-
tions or ‘# Grads’. Indeed, the actual timings of 100 iterations
of I-FGSM, PGD2, C&W, DDN and BP are 1.08, 1.36, 1.53,
1.46 and 1.17 s/image on average respectively on ImageNet,
using Tensorflow, Cleverhans implementation for I-FGSM and
C&W, and authors’ implementation for DDN.
We measure distortion when the adversarial images are
quantized by rounding each element to the nearest element
in X . This makes sense since adversarial images are meant to
be stored or communicated as images rather than real-valued
matrices. DDN and BP adversarial images are already quan-
tized. For reference, we report distortion without quantization
in Appendix IV-D.2.
Given a test set of N  images, we only consider its subset X
of N images that are classified correctly without attack. The
accuracy of the classifier is N/N  . Let Xsuc be the subset
of X with Nsuc := |Xsuc| where the attack succeeds and
let D(x) := x − y be the distortion for image x ∈ Xsuc.
The global statistics are the success probability Psuc and
3C&W performs line search on λ: “5×20” means 5 values of λ, 20 iterations
for each.
TABLE I
SUCCESS PROBABILITY PSUC AND AVERAGE DISTORTION D OF OUR
METHOD BP ON IMAGENET WITH DIFFERENT
Quantization Strategies
conditional average distortion D
Psuc := Nsuc
N





Here, D is conditioned on success. Indeed, distortion makes
no sense for a failure.
We define the operating characteristic of a given attack
over the set X as the function P : [0, Dmax] → [0, 1], where
Dmax := maxx∈Xsuc D(x). Given D ∈ [0, Dmax], P(D) is




|{x ∈ Xsuc : D(x) ≤ D}|. (22)
This function increases from P(0) = 0 to P(Dmax) = Psuc.
We sample one intermediate point: Pupp := P(Dupp) is
the success rate within a distortion upper bounded by
Dupp ∈ (0, Dmax).
It is difficult to define a fair comparison of distor-
tion constrained attacks to success constrained attacks (see
section II-B). For the first family, we run a given attack several
times over the test set with different distortion budget . The
attack succeeds on image x ∈ X if it succeeds on at least one
of the runs, and the distortion D(x) is the minimum distortion
over all successful runs. All statistics are then evaluated as
above.
C. Experimental Investigations
Before addressing the benchmark, this section investigates
on the role of quantization and of the parameters in BP.
1) Quantization: Table I shows the critical role of quan-
tization in our method BP. Since this attack is iterative and
works with continuous vectors, one may quantize only at the
end of the process, or at the end of each iteration. Another
option is to anticipate the detrimental action of quantizing
by adapting the length of each step accordingly, as done
by Q IN(·) and QOUT(·) in Algorithm 2. The experimental
results show that the key is to quantize often so to let the
next iterations compensate. Anticipating and adapting gives a
substantial extra improvement.
2) Parameter Study: There are two parameters in BP: α and
γmin . Both determine the step size of stage 1, while γmin also
determines the step size of stage 2. We consider 4 values for
α, i.e. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 9 values for γmin , i.e. 0.1, 0.2, . . . , 0.9.
For each pair of values, we evaluate BP with 20 iterations on
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TABLE II
SUCCESS PROBABILITY PSUC AND AVERAGE DISTORTION D WITH QUANTIZATION. PUPP IS THE SUCCESS RATE UNDER
DISTORTION BUDGET DUPP = 2 FOR MNIST, 0.7 FOR CIFAR10, AND 1 FOR IMAGENET
Fig. 3. Success probability Psuc and average distortion D for different values
of parameters α and γmin of BP with 20 iterations.
a validation set, which we define as a random subset sampled
of the training set: 10000 images for MNIST and CIFAR10,
and 1000 images for ImageNet. As shown in Fig. 3, success
probability is close to one in all cases, while average distortion
is in general stable up to γmin = 0.8. We choose α = 2 and
γmin = 0.7 for all experiments.
D. Benchmark
This section compares different attacks mentioned in this
article, with or without quantization, on various classifiers.
1) Attack Evaluation With Quantization: Table II summa-
rizes the global statistics of the benchmark. Fig. 4 offers a
more detailed view per dataset with operating characteristic.
In terms of average distortion, all iterative attacks perform
much better than the single-step FGSM. The performances of
C&W are on par with those of I-FGSM, which is unexpected
for this more elaborated attack design. The reason is that C&W
is put under stress in our benchmark. It usually requires a
bigger number of iterations to deliver high quality images.
Note that it is possible to avoid the line search on parameter
λ as shown in row 1×100. However, it requires a fine tuning so
that this single value works over all the images of the dataset.
This is not possible for ImageNet.
DDN and our method BP are clearly ahead of the bench-
mark. DDN yields lower distortion on MNIST at fewer itera-
tions, but its probability of success is not satisfying. DDN is
indeed better than BP only on CIFAR10 at 100 iterations.
Fig. 4 reveals that the two attacks have similar operating
characteristic on all datasets but this is because it refers to
100 iterations.
In terms of success rate, FGSM fails on MNIST; on
CIFAR10, I-FGSM and PGD2 fail as well; finally on Ima-
geNet, C&W fails too. DDN also fails on ImageNet at
20 iterations.
Increasing the number of iterations helps but not at the
same rate for all the attacks. For instance, going from
20 to 100 iterations is waste of time for I-FGSM while it
is essential for decreasing the distortion of DDN or making
PGD2 efficient on ImageNet. Most importantly, our attack
BP brings a dramatic improvement in the speed vs. distortion
trade-off. Just within 20 iterations, the distortion achieved on
ImageNet is very low compared to the others. Section IV-D.4
shows the speed vs. distortion trade-off in more detail.
Statistics of BP stages are as follows: On CIFAR-10 and
MNIST, Stage 1 takes 7 iterations on average. On ImageNet,
Stage 1 takes on average 3 iterations out of 20, or 8 iterations
out of 100. Appendix B shows examples of images along
with corresponding adversarial examples and perturbations for
different methods.
2) Attack Evaluation Without Quantization: Table III is the
equivalent of Table II but without the integral constraint: the
attack is free to output any real matrix provided that the pixel
values all belong to [0, 1]. When the distortion is large, there
is almost no difference.
When an attack delivers low distortion on average with
real matrices, the quantization may lower the probability of
success. This is especially true with the iterative attacks finding
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Fig. 4. Operating characteristics on MNIST, CIFAR10 and ImageNet. The number of iterations is 5× 20 for C&W and 100 for I-FGSM, PGD2, DDN and
our BP.
TABLE III
SUCCESS PROBABILITY PSUC AND AVERAGE DISTORTION D Without Quantization. PUPP MEASURED
AT DUPP = 2 FOR MNIST, 0.7 FOR CIFAR10, AND 1 FOR IMAGENET
Fig. 5. Operating characteristics on MNIST, CIFAR10 and ImageNet without quantization. The number of iterations is 5×20 for C&W and 100 for I-FGSM,
PGD2, DDN and our BP.
adversarial examples just nearby the border between the two
classes. Quantization jeopardizes this point and sometimes
brings it back in the true class region. More importantly,
the impact of the quantization on the distortion is no longer
negligible. This is clearly visible when comparing Table III
and Table II for DDN and BP over ImageNet.
Similarly, Fig. 5 is the equivalent of Fig. 4 without the inte-
gral constraint. By comparing the two figures, it can be seen
that PGD2 and C&W, but also DDN and BP, are improving
on ImageNet by having significantly lower distortion. This
agrees with measurements of success rate in Table III, where
PGD2 and C&W are not failing as they do in Table II with
quantization. Our BP is still the strongest attack over all
datasets.
3) Attack Evaluation on Robust Models: Table IV is sim-
ilar to Table II but is evaluating attacks on robust models.
In particular, on MNIST and CIFAR10, we use the same
models as described in Section IV-A, which we adversarially
train according to [27]. On ImageNet, we use off-the shelf4
InceptionV3 obtained by ensemble adversarial training on
four models [40].
In general, DDN and BP outperform all other attacks in
terms of either average distortion D or success rate Pupp.
On ImageNet in particular, all other attacks have significantly
higher distortion and fail in terms of success rate. DDN has
significantly greater distortion than BP and fails in terms of
success rate at 20 iterations, while at 100 iterations BP still
has lower distortion. DDN and BP have similar performance
on CIFAR10. On MNIST, DDN fails in terms of probability






SUCCESS PROBABILITY PSUC , AVERAGE DISTORTION D , AND SUCCESS RATE PUPP UNDER Adversarial Training WITH PGD AS THE REFERENCE ATTACK,
FOLLOWING [27] FOR MNIST AND CIFAR10; AND Ensemble Adversarial Training [40] FOR IMAGENET. PUPP MEASURED
AT DUPP = 2 FOR MNIST, 0.7 FOR CIFAR10, AND 1 FOR IMAGENET
Fig. 6. Operating characteristics of attacks against robust models: adversarial training with PGD as the reference attack [27] for MNIST and CIFAR10, and
ensemble adversarial training [40] for ImageNet. The number of iterations is 5× 20 for C&W and 100 for I-FGSM, PGD2, DDN and our BP.
Fig. 6 shows a more detailed view of operating characteris-
tics, similarly to Fig. 4 for models trained on natural images.
We can see that BP is still ahead of the competition. It is close
to DDN, but this is because Fig. 6 refers to 100 iterations. The
two attacks outperform all others by a large margin.
4) Speed vs. Distortion Trade-off: Figure 7(a) is a graphical
view of some results reported in Table II with more choices
of number of iterations between 20 and 100, and only for
ImageNet where our performance gain is the most significant.
Just within 20 iterations, its distortion D is already so much
lower than that of other attacks, that its decrease (-20% at
100 iterations) is not visible in Fig. 7. On the contrary,
more iterations are useless for I-FGSM, and PGD2 achieves
low distortion only with more than 50 iterations. Figure 7(b)
confirms that the probability of success is close to 1 for both
DDN and BP for the numbers of iterations considered.
E. Defense Evaluation With Adversarial Training
We also test under adversarial training [17]. The network
is re-trained with a dataset composed of the original training
set and the corresponding adversarial images. This training
is special: at the end of each epoch, the network is updated
and fixed, then the adversarial images for this new update are
forged by some reference attack, and the next epoch starts
with this new set. This is tractable only if the reference attack
is fast. We use it with FGSM as the reference attack.
It is more interesting to study DDN and BP as alternatives
to FGSM: at 20 iterations, they are fast enough to play the
Fig. 7. (a) Average distortion vs. number of iterations on ImageNet.
I-FGSM is not improving with iterations because it is constrained by .
(b) Corresponding probability of success.
role of the reference attack in adversarial training. In this case,
we follow the training process suggested by [32]: the model is
first trained on clean examples, then fine-tuned for 30 iterations
with adversarial examples. As shown in Table V, DDN and
BP perform equally better than FGSM on CIFAR10, in terms
of either average distortion or success rate. Among the reliable
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TABLE V
SUCCESS PROBABILITY PSUC , AVERAGE DISTORTION D , AND SUCCESS RATE PUPP UNDER Adversarial Training DEFENSE WITH I-FGSM, DDN,
OR BP AS THE REFERENCE ATTACK. PUPP MEASURED AT DISTORTION DUPP = 2 FOR MNIST, AND 0.7 FOR CIFAR10
attacks (i.e. whose Psuc is close to 1), the worst attack now
requires a distortion three times larger than the distortion of
the worst attack without defense. In the same way, on MNIST,
the distortion of the worst case attack doubles going from 1.37
(baseline) to 2.73 (BP defense). In most cases, BP is a better
defense than DDN, forcing the attacker to have 20% more
distortion. Note that for a given defense, the strongest attack
is almost always BP.
V. CONCLUSION
The main idea of BP is to travel on the manifold defined by
the class boundary while seeking to minimize distortion. This
travel is operated by the refinement stage, which alternates
on both sides of the boundary, but attempts to stay mostly
in the adversarial region. Referring to section II-A, BP is in
effect doing for the success constrained problem what PGD2
is doing for the distortion constrained problem: BP minimizes
distortion on the class boundary manifold (a level set of the
classification loss), while PGD2 minimizes the classification
loss on a sphere (a level set of the distortion).
BP also takes into account the detrimental effect of quan-
tization. By doing so, the amplitude of the perturbation is
controlled from one iteration to another. The main advantage
of our attack is the small number of iterations required to
achieve both reliability (probability of success close to one)
and high quality (low average distortion).
APPENDIX A
PREDICTING DISTORTION AFTER QUANTIZATION
This appendix aims at predicting when the quantization
cancels the perturbation, assuming that they are independent
of each other. Iteration i starts with a quantized image yi ∈ X ,
adds update u ∈ Rn , and then quantizes s.t. yi+1 = Q(yi+u).
Quantization is done by rounding with step  := 1/(L − 1):
yi+1, j = yi, j +e j if u j ∈ (e j−/2, e j+/2] with e j ∈ Z.
Border effects where yi, j + e j /∈ X are neglected.
We now take a statistical point of view where the update is
modelled by a random vector U uniformly distributed over
the hypersphere of radius ρ, the norm of the perturbation
before quantization. The quantization noise is now random,









The expectation of a sum is always the sum of the expec-
tations, whatever the dependence between the summands:
(D2) = ∑nj=1(E2j ) = n(E2j ). This expectation is not
null if  (|E j | ≥ ) > 0 since (D2) ≥ n2 (|E j | ≥ ).
This r.v. E j takes a value depending on the scalar product
Sj := Uc j , where c j is the j -th canonical vector. This scalar
product lies in [−ρ, ρ], so that  (E j ≥ ) = 0 if /2 > ρ.
Otherwise, |E j | ≥  when |Sj | ≥ /2, which happens when
U lies inside the dual hypercone of axis c j and semi-angle
θ = arccos(c) with c := /2ρ. The probability of this event
is equal to the ratio of the solid angles of this dual hypercone
and the full space Rn . This quantity can be expressed via the
incomplete regularized beta function I :
 (|E j | ≥ ) =
{
1− Ic2(1/2, (n − 1)/2), if c ≤ 1
0, otherwise
For large n, this probability approximately equals 2(−√nc).
In the end, the lower bound of (D2) after quantization
depends on , n, and ρ the norm of the perturbation before
quantization. When n = 3 ∗ 2992 (i.e. ImageNet), this lower
bound equals 2 (i.e. the smallest distortion if not null) for
ρ = 0.1. When the update has a smaller norm, quantization
is likely to kill it, yi+1 = yi , and we waste one iteration.
APPENDIX B
ADVERSARIAL IMAGE EXAMPLES
Fig. 8 shows the worst-case ImageNet examples for BP
along with the images generated by all methods and the cor-
responding normalized perturbations. FGSM has the highest
distortion over all methods and BP the lowest. DDN has the
highest∞-norm distortion. Observe that for no method is the
perturbation visible, although this is a worst-case example.
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Fig. 8. Original (left), adversarial (top row) and scaled perturbation (below) images against InceptionV3 on ImageNet. The five images are the worst 5 images
for BP requiring the strongest distortions, yet these are smaller than the distortions necessary with all other methods (The red color means that the forged
image is not adversarial). Perturbations are inverted (low is white; high is colored, per channel) and scaled in the same way for a fair comparison.
APPENDIX C
NETWORKS AND TRAINING PARAMETERS
A. MNIST [24]
We use a simple network with three convolutional layers
and one fully connected layer. The first convolutional layer
has 64 features, kernel of size 8 and stride 2; the second has
128 features, kernel 6 and stride 2; the third has 128 features,
kernel 5 and stride 1. It uses LeakyRelu activation [26]. The
loss function is the cross-entropy.
We train the network with the 60, 000 images of the train-
ing set. After a random initialization, training lasts 6 epochs
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with batch size 128, learning rate 0.001, and the optimizer is
Adam. Between epochs, the training data are shuffled.
B. CIFAR10 [21]
We use a simple CNN network with nine convolutional
layers, two max-pooling layers, two dropout layers, ending
in global average pooling and a fully connected layer. Batch
normalization [19] is applied after every convolutional layer.
It also uses LeakyRelu. The loss function is the cross-entropy.
All the kernels of the convolutional layers are initialized
with HeReLuNormal initializer, and their kernel size is 3.
For the first three convolutional layers, the number of filters
is 128 and the padding mode is ‘same’. For the following
three convolutional layers, the number of filters is 256 and
the padding mode is ‘same’. For the last three convolutional
layers, the padding mode is ’valid’. The seventh layer has
512 filters, while 256 filters for the eighth layer, and 128 filters
for the last layer. The parameter α for LeakyRelu is 0.1, and
the rate for dropout is 0.5. The pool size of the max pooling
layer is 2, the strides shape is 2 and the padding mode is
‘valid’. The pool size of the average pooling layer is 2 and
the strides shape is 6 and the padding mode is ‘valid’.
We trained the model with the 60, 000 images of the training
set. After a random initialization, training lasts 200 epochs
with batch size 128, learning rate 0.001, and the optimizer is
Adam. Between epochs, the training data are shuffled.
C. ImageNet [23]
We use InceptionV3 [36] with the pre-trained model from
TensorFlow-Slim image classification library.5
D. Robust Models - Attack Evaluation
We use the same network for MNIST and CIFAR10,
but the training differs. We follow the adversarial training
method [27], i.e. the models are trained with training data
and their adversarial version generated by PGD2. For MNIST,
PGD2 iterates 40 times with  = 0.3 while α = 0.01. The
training batch size is 50 over 100 epochs. For CIFAR10, PGD2
iterates 100 times, with  = 8/255 while α = 2/255. The
training batch size is 128 over 200 epochs. Between epochs,
the training data are shuffled.
The robust model for ImageNet is ensemble adversarial
training [40], which is directly taken from TensorFlow library.6
E. Robust Models - Defense Evaluation
The networks on MNIST and CIFAR10 are the same as
before.
On MNIST, it is trained from scratch with the same setup
but with training data and their adversarial examples. FGSM
defense model uses FGSM with  = 0.3. DDN and BP
defense model use these attacks with 20 iterations and the




On CIFAR10, only FGSM defense model is trained from
scratch. For DDN and BP defense model, we follow the
training suggested by [32]. The model is first trained on
clean examples, then fine-tuned for 30 iterations with adver-
sarial examples. The parameters are initialized randomly.
The optimizer is Momentum Optimizer, the initial learning
rate is 0.001 and the momentum is 0.9. It is trained with
200 epochs and the batch size 128. Between epochs, the train-
ing data are shuffled. FGSM defense model uses FGSM with
 = 0.3. DDN and BP defense model use these attacks with
20 iterations and same parameters as attack methods.
Experiments run on TensorFlow1.8.0-py2.7 over CUDA
9.0.176; Cleverhans [30] v2.0.0 produces the existing attacks.
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